A traitor tracing system enables a publisher to trace a pirate decryption box to one of the secret keys used to create the box. We present a traitor tracing system where ciphertext size is "constant," namely independent of the number of users in the system and the collusion bound. A ciphertext in our system consists of only two elements where the length of each element depends only on the security parameter. The down side is that private-key size is quadratic in the collusion bound. Our construction is based on recent constructions for fingerprinting codes.
can decrypt using its secret key. Certified players, of course, can enforce digital rights restrictions such as "do not copy" or "play once".
Clearly a pirate could hack a number of certified players and extract their secret keys. The pirate could then build a pirate decoder PD that will extract the cleartext content and ignore any relevant digital rights restrictions. Even worse, the pirate can make its pirate decoder widely available so that anyone can extract the cleartext content for themselves. DeCSS [17] , for example, is a widely distributed program for decrypting encrypted DVD content. This is where traitor tracing is helpful -when the pirate decoder PD is found, the distributor can run a tracing algorithm that interacts with the pirate decoder and outputs the index i of at least one of the keys sk i that the pirate used to create the pirate decoder. The distributor can then choose to take action against the owner of this sk i.
A precise definition of traitor tracing systems is given in [4] and is reproduced here in Appendix A. For now we give some intuition that will help explain our results. A traitor tracing system consists of four algorithms Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Trace. The Setup algorithm generates the broadcaster's key bk , a tracing key tk , and n recipient keys sk 1, . . . , sk n. The Encrypt algorithm encrypts the content using bk and the Decrypt algorithm decrypts using one of the sk i. The tracing algorithm Trace is the most interesting -it takes tk as input and interacts with a pirate decoder, treating it as a black-box oracle. It outputs the index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} of at least one key sk i that was used to create the pirate decoder.
We describe our system as a public-key scheme, namely bk is public and anyone who knows it can create broadcast messages (we could equally have described it as a secret key scheme). As in many traitor tracing constructions, the tracing key tk in our system must be kept secret. Our tracing algorithm is black-box: it need not look at the internals of the pirate decoder PD and only interacts with PD as if it were a decryption oracle.
A traitor tracing system is said to be t-collusion resistant if tracing succeeds as long as the pirate has fewer than t user keys at his disposal. If t = n the system is said to be fully collusion resistant. While ciphertext-size in our system is independent of n or t, private-key size is quadratic in t. More precisely, our basic system provides the following parameters as a function of the total number of users n, collusion bound t, and security parameter λ:
CT-len = O(λ)
SK-length = O(t 2 λ 2 log n)
Tracing-time = O(t 2 λ log n)
Setting t ← n gives the parameters for full collusion resistance. Note that ciphertext length is independent of n or t.
Related work
Traitor tracing systems have been studied extensively. We refer to [4] for various properties of traitor tracing systems. Traitor tracing constructions generally fall into two categories: combinatorial, as in [8, 25, 34, 35, 12, 13, 9, 30, 1, 33, 31, 24] , and algebraic, as in [21, 3, 26, 20, 10, 23, 37, 7, 4, 6] . The broadcaster's key bk in combinatorial systems can be either secret or public. Algebraic traitor tracing use public-key techniques and are often more efficient than the public-key instantiations of combinatorial schemes. In these systems the ciphertext length (for short messages) depends linearly on the collusion bound t. One exception is [4] which is fully collusion resistant with ciphertext size O( √ n). Some systems, including ours, only provide tracing capabilities. Other systems [26, 24, 16, 14, 10, 6] combine tracing with broadcast encryption to obtain trace-and-revoke features -after tracing, the distributor can revoke the pirate's keys without affecting any other legitimate decoder.
Kiayias and Yung [20] and others [7, 11] describe a blackbox tracing system that achieves constant rate for long messages, where rate is measured as the ratio of ciphertext length to plaintext length. For full collusion resistance, however, the ciphertext size is linear in the number of users n. For comparison, our system generates ciphertexts of constant size. It can provide constant rate (rate = 1) for long messages by using hybrid encryption (i.e. encrypt a short message-key using the traitor tracing system and encrypt the long data by using a symmetric cipher with the messagekey).
In most traitor tracing systems, including ours, the tracing key tk must be kept secret. Some systems, however, support public key tracing [27, 28, 38, 19, 7] .
Stateful vs. Stateless decoders: a stateless decoder is one that does not keep state between decryptions. For instance, software decoders, such as DeCSS, cannot keep any state. However, pirate decoders embedded in tamper resistant hardware, such as a pirate cable box, can keep state between successive decryptions. When the decoder detects that it is being traced it could shutdown and refuse to decrypt further inputs. A software decoder cannot do that. Kiayias and Yung [18] and others [22, 29, 32] show how to convert tracing systems for stateless decoders into tracing systems for stateful decoders by embedding robust watermarks in the content. Consequently, most tracing systems in the literature, as do we, focus on the stateless settings.
COLLUSION RESISTANT FINGERPRINTING CODES
Since our construction is based on collusion resistant fingerprinting codes, we first review their definition [5] . Collusion resistant codes are designed for fingerprinting digital content, but are also used in traitor tracing systems (e.g. [8, 20, 11, 32] ). Here we will use them to construct a traitor tracing system with short ciphertexts. We are only interested in binary codes, namely codes defined over {0, 1} (as opposed to a larger alphabet).
• For a wordw ∈ {0, 1} we writew = w1 . . . w where wi ∈ {0, 1} is the ith letter ofw for i = 1, . . . , .
• Let W = {w (1) , . . . ,w (t) } be a set of words in {0, 1} . We say that a wordw ∈ {0, 1} is feasible for W if for all i = 1, . . . , there is a j ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that wi =w « then all words of the formˆ0`0 1´`0 1´1`0 1´˜a re feasible for W .
• For a set of words W ⊆ {0, 1} we say that the feasible set of W , denoted F (W ), is the set of all words that are feasible for W .
• For a set of words W ⊆ {0, 1} we say that position j ∈ {1, . . . , } is critical for W if the words in W are all '0' or all '1' at position j.
A fingerprinting code is a pair of algorithms (G, T ) defined as follows:
• Algorithm G, called a code generator, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a pair (n, ) as input, where n is the number of words to output and ∈ (0, 1) is a security parameter. The algorithm outputs a pair (Γ, tk ). Here Γ (called a code) contains n words in {0, 1} for some > 0 (called the code length). The output tk is called the tracing key.
• Algorithm T , called a tracing algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a pair (w * , tk ) wherew * ∈ {0, 1} . The algorithm outputs a subset S of {1, . . . , n}. Informally, elements in S are "accused" of creating the wordw * .
We require that G and T run in polynomial time in n log(1/ ). Security of a fingerprinting code (G, T ) is defined using a game between a challenger and an adversary. Let n be an integer and ∈ (0, 1). Let C be a subset of {1, . . . , n}. Both the challenger and adversary are given (n, , C) as input. Then the game proceeds as follows:
1. The challenger runs G(n, ) to obtain (Γ, tk ) where Γ = {w (1) , . . . ,w (n) }. It sends the set W := {w (i) }i∈C to the adversary.
The adversary outputs a wordw
We say that the adversary A wins the game if T (w * , tk ) is empty or not a subset of C. Let CR Adv[(G(n, ), T, C), A] be the probability that A wins the game. Definition 1. We say that a fingerprinting code (G, T ) is fully collusion resistant if for all adversaries A, all n > 0, all ∈ (0, 1), and all subsets C ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we have that
We say that (G, T ) is t-collusion resistant if for all adversaries A, all n > t, all ∈ (0, 1), and all subsets C ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size at most t, we have
Tardos [36] Full collusion resistance 
Known results on collusion resistant codes
Boneh and Shaw [5] constructed a fully collusion resistant fingerprinting code as well as t-collusion resistant codes. Tardos [36] improved these results by constructing shorter codes. The resulting code lengths are summarized in Table 1. Throughout the paper, except for Section 4, we will primarily rely on the Tardos construction.
We note that Chor et al. [8] constructed collusion resistant codes, but their codes are defined over a much larger alphabet, namely Γ is a subset of {1, . . . , t} rather than {0, 1} . For the application we have in mind it is crucial that we use a fingerprinting code defined over a binary alphabet. Other constructions over large alphabets include [34, 35, 13, 33, 31] 
A TRAITOR-TRACING SYSTEM WITH SHORT CIPHERTEXTS
Let E := (Genc, Eenc, Denc) be a public-key encryption system. We let M λ denote the finite message space of E with security parameter λ. Throughout the paper we assume that its size |M λ | is finite, but exponential in the security parameter. For simplicity we write M rather than M λ .
Let (Gtt , Ttt ) be a fingerprinting code. Our traitor tracing system TT works as follows: (traitor tracing systems are defined in Appendix A) Setup(n, λ): Let := 1/2 λ . The algorithm works as follows:
1. Generate a fingerprinting code by running
2. Generate 2 public/secret key pairs by running Genc 2 times:
for i = 1, . . . , and j = 0, 1 do:
An example secret key is shown in Figure 1 .
. Output bk , tk , and (sk 1, . . . , sk n)
Note that the ciphertext is short.
Including the index j in the ciphertext is done for convenience. In principle, j can be removed at the cost of forcing the decryptor to try all 1 ≤ j ≤ n until a j is found for which decryption succeeds (assuming the encryption system E embeds an integrity tag in ciphertexts). Clearly this is undesirable in all but extreme cases where the cost of bandwidth is much higher than the cost of computation.
The tracing algorithm: intuition
Suppose the adversary obtains a set of t secret keys and uses them to build a pirate decoder PD. For now let us assume that PD is a perfect decoder, namely it correctly decrypts well-formed ciphertexts. The t keys at the adversary's disposal correspond to t words in the fingerprinting code Γ ⊆ {0, 1} . Let C ⊆ {0, 1} be the set containing these t words. Now, consider a particular j ∈ {1, . . . , } and consider the invalid ciphertext
ere m is some message not equal to 0. This ciphertext is invalid since the message encrypted under pk [j, 0] is different from the message encrypted under pk [j, 1]. Let us consider what happens when we run PD on c * . We are interested in two cases.
• Case 1: Suppose all t codewords in C contain a 1 in position j. Then the adversary does not have sk [j, 0] and therefore PD(c * ) will return a quantity different than m with high probability.
• Case 2: Suppose all t codewords in C contain a 0 in position j. Now the adversary does not have sk [j, 1] and therefore PD cannot distinguish c * from a wellformed ciphertext. Consequently, PD(c * ) will return m (otherwise PD is not a perfect pirate decoder).
To make use of these two observations, let us define experiments, denoted by TRj for j = 1, . . . , . Experiment TRj is defined as follows:
Define wj ∈ {0, 1} as follows: 
is in the feasible set F (C). But then running the tracing algorithm Ttt of the collusion resistant code on inputw * will output the identity of at least one of the words in C, which is also the identity of one of the keys in the pirate's possession.
The tracing algorithm
To make the intuition above rigorous, we spell out the tracing algorithm. The tracing algorithm Trace PD (tk ) works as follows:
1. For each j in {1, . . . , } run experiment TRj once.
Define the wordw
* as in equations (1) and (2).
Overall, the tracing algorithm makes a total of O( ) calls to the pirate decoder PD. Using Tardos's t-collusion resistant code we have = O(t 2 log(n/ )) = O(t 2 λ log n) and therefore the total number of queries to PD is # PD queries = O`t 2 λ log(n)Ẃ e note that this tracing algorithm is minimal access as defined at the end of appendix A. That is, the tracing algorithm does not need access to the decrypted message from PD. It only needs to know whether the ciphertext was decrypted correctly. This is a useful property when tracing pirate music players in practice -one only gets to observe whether the player plays the music or not.
Security
The following theorem shows that the traitor tracing system TT is t-collusion resistant, namely it satisfies the security definition in Appendix A. For the public-key system E and a semantic security adversary B we use SS Adv[B, E ] to denote B's advantage in winning the semantic security game against E . 
The semantic security property (namely the bound on MH Adv[A, TT (n)] defined in Appendix A, Game 1) is immediate. We bound the adversary's advantage in winning the tracing game, namely TR Adv[A, TT (n, t)] defined in Appendix A, Game 2. This will follow from Lemma 2 below. For an adversary A in Game 2 we letw * (A) denote the random variable representing the wordw * constructed in step 2 in the tracing algorithm while tracing a pirate decoder PD created by A. 
Proof. Consider a modified tracing algorithm that produces a wordq * (A) as follows. For all j = 1, . . . , run experiment TR j defined in Figure 2 and define qj ∈ {0, 1} as:
0 if m =m, and 1 otherwise.
We say that position j is critical for A if all words in C contain the same symbol at position j. We claim that Pr[wj = qj] must be negligible at all critical positions. In particular, for all critical positions j ∈ {1, . . . , } there is a polynomial time semantic security adversary B for E such that
To see why, notice that when all bits at position j 
Let bad be the event that there exists some critical coordinate j for which wj = qj . It follows from (3) 
To complete the proof we argue that
There are two cases
• Consider a bit position j where all words in C have a 1 at position j. We argue that qj = 1 with high probability. For this j, the ciphertextĉ * does not depend on m and therefore running PD(ĉ * ) will output m with probability at most 1/|M|. We conclude that for this j the probability that qj = 1 is at most 1/|M|.
• Consider a bit position j where all words in C have a 0 in position j. We argue that qj = 0. For this j, the ciphertextĉ * is a valid encryption of m and, since PD is a perfect decoder, PD(ĉ * ) will output m with probability 1. Hence, qj will always equal 0.
Summing over all bit positions we see that the probability thatq * (A) is inconsistent with C in any critical position is at most /|M|. It follows that
Putting together equations (4) and (5) proves the lemma.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1 observe that when w * (A) ∈ F (C) then Ttt (w * (A), tk ) outputs a member of C with probability at least . Hence,
as required.
TRACING IMPERFECT DECODERS
Our definition of secure traitor tracing in Appendix A requires that the adversary produce a perfect pirate decoder PD, namely a decoder that correctly decrypts all wellformed ciphertexts. In reality, the pirate may be content with a decoder PD than works only a fraction of the time, say decrypts only 10% of well-formed ciphertexts (this may be useful for content that is repeated frequently). When the tracing algorithm from Section 3 interacts with such a decoder it may produce a wordw * that is not in the adversary's feasible set F (C) and consequently the fingerprinting code may fail to trace.
For a given broadcast key bk , let δ be the probability that PD fails to decrypt well-formed ciphertexts:
We call δ the error-rate of PD. Until now we focused on perfect pirates, namely when δ = 0.
In this section we consider imperfect decoders. We assume that the broadcaster fixes an upper bound on δ and is not interested in tracing decoders with error-rate higher than δ since their usefulness is limited. Hence, we need only trace decoders PD whose error-rate is less than some fixed δ. Formally, the Setup algorithm for the traitor tracing system takes δ as a third input.
Robust fingerprinting codes
To address imperfect decoders we need a more sophisticated tracing algorithm as well as more powerful fingerprinting codes. We start with the requirements on the fingerprinting codes. When tracing an imperfect decoder PD there may be several coordinates where we fail to determine which keys are in the adversary's possession. Our traitor tracing algorithm (described in Section 4.3) will place a '?' in these coordinates. Consequently, unlike Section 3, the interaction with PD results in a "noisy" codeword
PD can cause a '?' to appear in any coordinate inw * , as long as the overall number of '?' inw * is bounded. To trace noisy codewords we extend the definition of collusion resistant fingerprinting from Section 2. First, for a set of words W ⊆ {0, 1} we say that a wordw ∈ {0, 1, ?} is feasible for W if it is feasible for W when one considers only the non-'?' coordinates. That is,w ∈ {0, 1, ?} is feasible for W = {w (1) , . . . ,w (t) } if for all i = 1, . . . , eitherwi =?
or there is a j ∈ {1, . . . , t} such thatwi =w (j)
i . We say that the extended feasible set for W , denoted F ? (W ), is the set of all feasible words for W in {0, 1, ?} .
Informally, we say that a fingerprinting code is δ-robust if the tracing algorithm can trace a wordw * ∈ {0, 1, ?} that is feasible for a subset C and contains at most δ · symbols '?', back to a member of C. More precisely, we modify step 2 in the game used in Definition 1 as follows:
2. The adversary outputs a wordw * ∈ F ? (W ) that contains at most δ · symbols '?'.
We let CR Adv[(G(n, , δ), T, C), A] be the probability that
A wins the game and we use this quantity in Definition 1 as follows.
Definition 2.
We say that a fingerprinting code (G, T ) is δ-robust fully collusion resistant if for all adversaries A, all n > 0, all ∈ (0, 1), and all subsets C ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we have that CR Adv[ (G(n, , δ) 
, T, C), A] <
We say that (G, T ) is δ-robust t-collusion resistant if for all adversaries A, all n > t, all ∈ (0, 1), and all subsets C ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size at most t, we have
CR Adv[(G(n, , δ), T, C), A] <
Several results in the literature trace noisy codewords (codewords containing '?'). Most relevant is a recent result of Sirvent [32] who constructed codes satisfying Definition 2. Other results address much weaker notions of robustness, and are insufficient for our application:
• Boneh and Shaw [5] allow '?' symbols in the wordw * , but only at non-critical coordinates (i.e. coordinates where C is not all 0 or all 1). In our case, however, PD is free to cause a '?' symbol to appear in any coordinate.
• Guth and Pfitzmann [15] consider fingerprinting codes where a δ-fraction of the coordinates inw * are '?'. The '?' locations, however, must be chosen independently of the attacker's view. In our case, A can instruct PD to adversarialy choose the location of '?' symbols. For example, the adversary may cause a '?' to appear at all critical coordinates.
In the context of fingerprinting digital content, there was never a reason to study fingerprinting codes that resist adversarial corruptions as is needed here.
Tracing using robust fingerprinting codes
We show that the traitor tracing system of Section 3 can be adapted to trace imperfect decoders, as long as the underlying fingerprinting code is robust. The system is unchanged except that the tracing algorithm works differently. It can trace a decoder PD with error rate at most δ as long as the underlying fingerprinting code is δ -robust for a suitably chosen δ .
The new tracing algorithm interacts with PD using the experiments defined in Figure 3 . It runs all experiments and obtains pairs (pj, qj ) for j = 1, . . . , . To give some intuition we make two observations about the quantities pj and qj computed in these experiments:
• First, if pj > 0 then the adversary A must possess sk [j, 0], since otherwise E is not semantically secure (E allows decryption of content without the key).
• Second, if pj and qj are "far apart" then A must possess sk [j, 1], since, again, otherwise E is not semantically secure (E distinguishes encryptions of 0 from encryptions of m).
Observe also that qj is computed by running the pirate decoder on valid ciphertexts and therefore qj is an estimate for the decoder's error rate for ciphertexts that use coordinate j. These observations motivate defining the following codeword: for j = 1, . . . , let wj ∈ {0, 1} be wj := and setw * := w1 . . . w . The symbol '?' at position j indicates that PD refuses to decrypt most valid ciphertexts created for coordinate j. We know nothing about A's knowledge of keys at this position.
The codewordw * satisfies two important properties: First, with high probability (i.e. probability at least 1 − f (λ) for some negligible function f ), the fraction of '?' symbols in w * is at most
The proof is via a standard probabilistic argument showing that otherwise PD will incorrectly decrypt more than a δ fraction of well-formed ciphertexts: qj is a good approximation to the actual probabilityqj that when the jth coordinate is used PD decrypts correctly. Ifqj ≥ ) which must be less than δ. Soving for δ gives (6) . (We assume that λ is sufficiently large to ensure that δ < 1.) Second, one can show an analogue of Lemma 2. Let C be the set of codewords corresponding to the set of private keys in the adversary's possession. Then semantic security of E implies thatw * is contained in F ? (C), with high probability. To see this we have to consider two cases: the probability that pj > 0 when the adversary does not possess sk [j, 1] , which is negligible, and the probability the adversary has of making pj = 0 but qj >
when not possessing sk[j, 1]. If we replace in the first step of RobustTRj the encryption of 0 with m, then the adversary's chance of success is exponentially small. If now for the original RobustTRj the probability of this event is not negligible, then we have a distinguisher for encryptions of a collection of random messages from encryptions of the all 0 collection, violating the semantic security of E .
These two facts show that if the underlying fingerprinting code is δ -robust then applying the fingerprinting tracing algorithm to the codewordw * will identify a non-empty subset of keys in the adversary's possession, with high probability.
In summary, the modified tracing algorithm works as follows:
1. For each j in {1, . . . , } run experiment RobustTRj and define the wordw * as above.
2. Output Ttt (w * , tk ).
We argued that tracing succeeds as long as the underlying fingerprinting code is δ -robust.
Constructing robust fingerprinting codes
It remains to construct a δ-robust code to be used in the traitor tracing system of Section 3. We extend the BonehShaw fingerprinting code [5] to make it δ-robust for any fixed repeat the following steps λ 2 ln times:
let pj be the fraction of times that m =m repeat the following steps λ 2 ln times:
let qj be the fraction of times that m =m δ ∈ [0, 1). We note that Sirvent [32] recently presented a related construction. Constructing these codes is purely combinatorial and does not depend on complexity assumptions.
The Boneh-Shaw codes
We begin with a brief review of the Boneh-Shaw code. The fully collusion resistant code for n users is built from the following set of n words Γ0, where each word consists of n + 1 blocks and each block is d-wide: word n: 0000 0000 0000 · · · 0000 1111 (7) The total codeword length is = d(n + 1). The code generator G picks a random permutation π on (1, . . . , ) and permutes the columns of Γ0 according to π. It outputs the resulting n codewords as the code Γ with tracing-key tk := π.
For notational convenience we will occasionally ignore the permutation π and use the term "block i of Γ" or "block i of a codeword w" to mean the set of coordinates that correspond (via π −1 ) to block number i in Γ0. Let W be a subset of codewords in Γ that does not include codeword number i. Observe that an adversary A who is given W , cannot distinguish columns from block number i − 1 from columns belonging to block number i. Therefore, one expects that the codewordw * generated by A contains roughly the same number of '1's in block i − 1 as in block i. In fact, if block i inw * contains many more '1's than block i − 1, then we can conclude that A can distinguish block i from i − 1 and therefore A is in possession of codeword number i.
Suppose A is given words W ⊂ Γ and letw * ∈ F (W ) be a codeword generated by A. For i = 0, . . . , n let ai be the weight of the ith block ofw * , namely the number of 1s in block i. Computing the quantities a0, . . . , an requires the tracing-key tk to undo the random permutation π. Boneh and Shaw show that if there is a gap between block i and i − 1, namely
then A is in possession of codeword number i with probability at least 1 − ( /n) (they actually prove a stronger statement, but that is not needed for our discussion). Equation (8) gives a tracing algorithm that accuses an innocent i with probability at most : output all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that ai − ai−1 > Δ. However, we must ensure that there is always some i that satisfies (8) . Sincew * ∈ F (W ) we know that a0 = 0 and an = d and therefore there is some 1 ≤ i ≤ n for which ai − ai−1 > d/n. If we ensure that d/n > Δ then equation (8) will be satisfied for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as required. To ensure d/n > Δ we solve for d and obtain:
implying that the code length is = dmin · (n + 1) = O(n 3 log(n/ )).
Overall, we tracew * to some codeword used to create it and our tracing algorithm never outputs an empty set.
A δ-robust variant of Boneh-Shaw
We show that to make the code δ-robust it suffices to increase the block width dmin to dmin := 4n
Suppose A is given words W ⊂ Γ and letw * ∈ F ? (W ) be a codeword generated by A that contains at most δ · symbols '?'. For i = 0, . . . , n let bi be the number of '?' symbols in block i ofw * . Let ai be the number of '1's in block i ofw * . We modify the original Boneh-Shaw tracing algorithm as follows.
Step 1: use the tracing-key tk to compute ai and bi for all i = 0, . . . , n;
Step 2: output all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
The same logic as in the original algorithm shows that this tracing algorithm accuses an innocent party with probability at most 2 . To see why, we re-iterate that without codeword number i the adversary cannot distinguish columns in block i from columns in block i − 1 and therefore cannot create a large gap between ai and ai−1 or between bi and bi−1. Therefore, the existence of a gap indicates that codeword i was used to createw * . More precisely, we argue that if user i is not a member of W then
By the union bound it suffices to show that It remains to ensure that the modified tracing algorithm will not output the empty set. The algorithm will output the empty set only if ai+1 − ai ≤ Δ and bi+1 − bi ≤ Δ for all i = 1, . . . , n (11) Moreover, we have the following facts:
• Sincew * ∈ F ? (W ) we know that a0 = 0 (i.e. there can be no 1 in block 0) and an + bn = d (i.e. there can be no 0 in block n).
• Sincew * contains at most δ symbols '?', there must be some block 0 ≤ j ≤ n such that bj ≤ δ /(n + 1). Since = (n + 1)d we obtain bj ≤ δd.
Using (11) and a0 = 0 we deduce that an ≤ Δ · n. Using (11) and bj ≤ δd we deduce that bn ≤ δd + Δ · n. Therefore, if (11) holds then it must be that:
If we choose d sufficiently large so that (12) is false then (11) cannot hold and the tracing algorithm will output a non-empty set. Solving for d we obtain dmin > 4n
which leads to a code of length
We obtain a δ-robust fingerprinting code for any δ ∈ [0, 1). This in turn leads to a fully collusion-resistant traitortracing system with constant size ciphertext and private keys of size . The tracing algorithm works by constructingw * using experiments RobustTRj and then running the robust fingerprint tracing algorithm onw * . Sirvent [32, Section 4.3] shows that the method in [5] can be used to extend a δ-robust fully collusion resistant code to a δ -robust t-collusion resistant code (for some δ < δ), where the length of the code grows with t 4 log n rather than with n 3 . For small collusions this shrinks the code length which in turn shrinks the size of secret keys in our system.
CONCLUSIONS
We constructed a t-collusion resistant traitor tracing system where ciphertext size is independent of n or t. The system makes use of advances in fingerprinting codes. For full collusion resistance one can take t = n, without increasing the ciphertext size. Although ciphertexts are short, privatekey size is quadratic in t. Our tracing algorithm is blackbox and is based on repeated sampling of the pirate decoder. Tracing a perfect decoder requires about O(t 2 λ) interactions with the pirate decoder.
Our tracing algorithm can trace both perfect and imperfect pirate decoders. To trace decoders with error-rate less than δ in [0, 1) we need to increase the size of the secret key to about O(n 3 λ/(1 − δ) 2 ). The ciphertext is still constant size. Tracing is done using δ-robust fingerprinting codes which we construct from the Boneh-Shaw code. It is likely that the fingerprinting code of Tardos [36] can also be made robust, but we leave this for future work.
Setup(n, λ)
The setup algorithm takes as input n, the number of users in the system, and the security parameter λ. The algorithm outputs a public key bk , a secret tracing key tk , and private keys sk 1, . . . , sk n, where sk u is given to user u.
Encrypt(bk , m)
Encrypts m using the public broadcasting key bk and outputs ciphertext C.
Decrypt(j, sk j , C) Decrypt C using the private key sk j of user j. The algorithm outputs a message m or ⊥.
Trace PD (tk ) The tracing algorithm is an oracle algorithm that is given as input the tracing key tk . The tracing algorithm queries the pirate decoder PD as a blackbox oracle. It outputs a set S which is a subset of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
All these algorithms must run in polynomial time in λ and n. Moreover, the system must satisfy the following correctness property: for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all messages m:
Security
We define security of the traitor tracing scheme in terms of the following two natural games, called message-hiding and traceability.
Game 1
The first game is the standard Semantic Security Game. It says that the system is semantically secure to an outsider who does not possess any of the private keys. Since this is a standard notion we do not give the game details here. We denote the advantage of adversary A in winning this message hiding game as MH Adv[A, TT (n)](λ).
Game 2
The second game captures the notion of Traceability against t-collusion. For a given n, t, λ, the game proceeds as follows (both challenger and adversary are given n, t, and λ as input):
1. The adversary A outputs a set T = {u1, u2, . . . , uj } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of at most t colluding users.
2. The challenger runs Setup(n, λ) and provides bk and sk u 1 , . . . , sk u j to A. It keeps tk to itself.
3. The adversary A outputs a pirate decoder PD.
The challenger now runs
Trace PD (tk ) to obtain a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Note that Trace is only given blackbox oracle access to PD.
We say that the adversary A wins the game if the following two conditions hold:
• The decoder PD is perfect. That is, for a randomly chosen m in the finite message space, we have that Pr[PD (Encrypt(bk , m)) = m] = 1 (13)
• The set S is either empty, or is not a subset of T . We denote by TR Adv[A, TT (n, t)](λ) the probability that adversary A wins this game.
Definition 3. We say that a Traitor Tracing system TT is t-collusion resistant if for all n > t and all polynomial time adversaries A we have that MH Adv[A, TT (n)](λ) and TR Adv[A, TT (n, t)](λ) are negligible functions of λ.
In Game 2 we require the pirate decoder PD to be perfect and decrypt all well-formed ciphertexts. We discuss imperfect pirate decoders in Section 4. Definition 3 easily generalizes to handle non-perfect decoders as in [4] : simply change (13) Also note that we are modeling a stateless (resettable) pirate decoder -the decoder is just an oracle and maintains no state between activations. Non stateless decoders were studied in [18] .
Minimal access decoders
The black-box tracing model described above is often called the full access model -the tracer is given the decryptions output by PD. When the decoder PD is a tamper resistant box, such as a music player, the tracer does not get direct access to decryptions; it only sees whether a given ciphertext results in music being played or not. To address this issue we define a more restricted black-box tracing model called minimal access tracing. This model is similar to the game above with the exception that the challenger presents the tracing algorithm with a more restricted oracle P(·, ·) which takes a message-ciphertext pair as input and outputs:
We then modify Step 4 of Game 2 above so that challenger runs Trace P (tk , ) to obtain a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Consequently, in the minimal access game the tracing algorithm is given far more restricted access to PD. One can argue [3] that this model accurately captures the problem of tracing a stateless tamper resistant decoder. It is not difficult to see that our tracing algorithm works in the minimal access model.
